Fiscal and spending behavior of local governments : Identification of price effects when prices are not observed
Journal article, Peer reviewed
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http://hdl.handle.net/11250/178138Utgivelsesdato
2003Metadata
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Originalversjon
Aaberge, R. and A. Langørgen (2003): "Fiscal and spending behavior of local governments : Identification of price effects when prices are not observed." Public Choice, Vol.117, 1-2, 125-161. Springer http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1026140201401Sammendrag
Abstract. This paper analyzes local public fiscal and spending behavior in a setting where
local governments, represented by the dominant party or coalition, are treated as utility maximizing
agents. The econometric analysis, which is based on a modified version of ELES,
recognizes total spending as well as total income as endogenous variables. Identification of the
price effects is achieved by utilizing data on environmental cost factors and local tastes. The
performance of the estimated model is investigated by testing its ability to make out-of-sample
predictions of local government behavior.
Beskrivelse
The original publication is available at www.springer.com