dc.contributor.author | Bjertnæs, Geir Haakon | |
dc.contributor.author | Fæhn, Taran | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-25T09:50:30Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-25T09:50:30Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2004 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1892-753x | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/180929 | |
dc.description.abstract | Abstract:
Welfare analyses of energy taxes typically show that systems with uniform rates perform better than
differentiated systems, especially if revenue increases can be recycled via cuts in more distortionary
taxes. However, in the practical policy debates, the scope for efficiency gains is traded against
industrial concerns. A major explanation to the widespread use of exemptions in energy tax systems
has to be sought in the fact that energy-dependent industries tend to constitute powerful lobby
groups. Presumably, energy-dependent industries of small, open economies will suffer relatively
strongly if taxed, and compensating them will be costly. This CGE study of the case of equalising the
Norwegian electricity tax shows that compensating the energy-intensive export industries is
surprisingly modest. It is explained by the role of the Nordic electricity market, which is still limited
enough to respond to national energy tax reforms. Thus, electricity price reductions partly neutralise
the direct impact of the tax on profits. We also examine the effects of different compensation
schemes and find significant compensation cost reductions when the scheme is designed to release
productivity gains. | no_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
dc.publisher | Statistics Norway, Research Department | no_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion Papers;No. 387 | |
dc.subject | Energy taxes | no_NO |
dc.subject | Electricity markets | no_NO |
dc.subject | Competitiveness | no_NO |
dc.subject | CGE models se Computable general equilibrium model (CGE model) | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: F41 | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: H21 | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: Q43 | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: Q48 | no_NO |
dc.subject | Small open economy | no_NO |
dc.subject | Taxes | no_NO |
dc.subject | Energy-dependent industries | no_NO |
dc.subject | Nordic electricity market | no_NO |
dc.subject | Norway | no_NO |
dc.subject | Computable general equilibrium model (CGE model) | |
dc.title | Energy taxation in a small, open economy : efficiency gains under political restraints | no_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | no_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 | no_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 29 s. | no_NO |