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by

Kenneth Aarskaug Wiik & Janna Bergsvik

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Statistisk sentralbyrå
Statistics Norway

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Kenneth Aarskaug Wiik (Corresponding author)
Research Department, Statistics Norway
Email: kaw@ssb.no

Janna Bergsvik
Research Department, Statistics Norway
Email: jbk@ssb.no

Abstract

Several studies have shown that immigrants marrying natives experience better economic outcomes than those marrying other immigrants, but we know less about partner choice and the economic outcomes of the children of immigrants and among those forming cohabiting unions. Utilizing Norwegian register data from all cohabiting and marital unions formed between 2006 and 2018 involving second-generation and childhood immigrants ($N=49,692$ couples, 65% cohabiting), we explored how partner choice relates to employment status, individual income, and household income for up to fourteen years after union formation. Overall, children of immigrants with native partners were more frequently employed and earned higher incomes than those who chose partners from migrant backgrounds. Fixed effects model results confirmed that children of immigrants who partnered endogamously experienced less favorable employment and individual income trajectories compared to those partnering with natives. We discovered similar negative impacts on the likelihood of employment and on the individual incomes of men who partnered exogamously with migrant-background women. However, when ignoring initial selection and shifting focus solely to changes post-union formation, we found that partnering endogamously had a positive effect on household income. In general, we observed the strongest effects among women and those married, and we noticed important differences across global regions of origin.

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Introduction

Numerous studies have investigated the partner choice patterns of immigrants, and many researchers see widespread intermarriage in a society as evidence of immigrant integration and weakening social distance between groups (Alba and Foner 2015; Elwert 2020; Kalmijn and Van Tubergen 2010; Qian and Lichter 2007). Nevertheless, fewer studies have so far investigated the consequences of partner choice among migrant-background populations, be it demographic or socioeconomic outcomes (Kalmijn 2010; Lichter and Qian 2019; Schwartz 2013). From the studies that do exist, there is evidence that immigrants married to natives have higher earnings (Furtado and Song 2015; Meng and Gregory 2005; Justiniano and Valentova 2023), more often are employed (e.g., Brekke 2013; Dribe and Lundh 2008), and have higher chances of occupational mobility (Muttarak 2011) than those married to immigrants. Although most studies have focused on those married, a similar income premium has been found for immigrants cohabiting with natives (Elwert and Tegunimataka 2016), and for immigrant men in parental unions with majority women (Dribe and Nystedt 2015).

We know less about the role of partner choice for the economic integration of second-generation immigrants (Muttarak 2011), particularly among those forming non-marital cohabiting unions. In the current study, we aim to fill this knowledge gap using all-encompassing Norwegian population data allowing for rigorous and sound statistical analyses. Like other European populations, the Norwegian population is increasingly diverse, with growing shares of immigrants and their descendants. Today, one in five Norwegians has a migration background, meaning that they either immigrated or were born in Norway to two foreign-born parents (Statistics Norway 2023a). The second generation (i.e., native born by two immigrant parents) is a growing population group, with new origin groups reaching family formation ages annually. At the same time, family behaviors have become more diverse. From the late 1960s onwards, cohabitation and non-marital childbearing have spread

and become standard behaviors across most Western societies, particularly in the Nordic countries (Thomson 2014). In the general Norwegian population, 68% of partnerships in the age group 25–34 are cohabitations and 53% of births are to cohabiting couples (Statistics Norway 2023b, 2023c). Also, many migrant-background groups in Norway are increasingly choosing cohabitation (Wiik 2022), underlining the importance of including this union type when studying their family behaviors.

Using Norwegian longitudinal register data on all co-residential unions formed from 2006 through 2018 including at least one second-generation or childhood migrant ($N=49,692$), we assess associations between partner choice and labor market outcomes. We focus on exogamous (i.e., originating from a different country or a majority partner) and endogamous (i.e., originating from the same country) partner choices and assess the following outcomes: Employment, individual labor income, and household income. In a first set of analyses, we investigate differences in these labor market outcomes averaged across all years, and then assess the effects of partner choice on developments after union formation by controlling for time-invariant individual heterogeneity using fixed effects models.

This research adds to the existing literature on the socioeconomic consequences of partner choice among individuals with a migrant background in several distinct ways. First, unlike most previous studies, we focus on the children of immigrants, i.e., immigrants arriving as children or teens and the second generation. Second, by including both marital and cohabiting unions, and by distinguishing between endogamous and exogamous migrant-background unions, this study offers a broader perspective than prior research on this topic, which has typically focused on native-immigrant versus immigrant-immigrant marriages. The children of immigrants, especially the second generation and those who arrived at younger ages, are fluent in the native language and have gained institutional knowledge and education in their resident countries. Despite these advantages, our findings reveal that the children of

immigrants who partner natives fare better in the labor market than those who partner endogamously. Studying the link between partner choice and the economic outcomes of these individuals is thus key for understanding long-term structural integration. Our analysis is unusually comprehensive as we use population wide data and rigorous statistical methods to examine three related but distinct outcomes, each capturing a unique facet of economic integration: workforce participation, career success, and household purchasing power.

Prior Research on the Economic Consequences of Partner Choice

Immigrants married to natives have higher earnings than those married to other immigrants in countries such as Australia (Meng and Gregory 2005), France (Meng and Meurs 2009), Denmark (Elwert and Tegunimataka 2016), and the U.S. (Furtado and Song 2015). Similar income premiums were found for immigrant women in Italy (Justiniano and Valentova 2023), and for immigrant men in parental unions with Swedish majority women (Dribe and Nystedt 2015). In Sweden (Dribe and Lundh 2008) and the U.S. (Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2009), immigrants married to natives were more often employed than those married to immigrants. Immigrant women from Iraq, Somalia, Vietnam, Iran, and Turkey marrying a Norwegian-born man were more likely to participate in the labor market than those marrying a non-OECD immigrant (Brekke 2013). Further, Norwegian couples in which the woman or both partners immigrated from non-Western countries more often practiced traditional breadwinning roles, with men earning most of the household income. In couples consisting of non-Western immigrant men and majority women, women had higher relative incomes than in majority couples (Bergsvik, Kitterød, and Wiik 2020).

Fewer studies have assessed the role of intermarriage on the socioeconomic integration of second-generation immigrants (Muttarak 2011). With one exception (Çelikaksoy 2007), existing studies have focused solely on employment outcomes and have not assessed income

effects of partner choice. Focusing on second-generation women in Norway, Brekke and Rogstad (2011) found a negative employment gradient of marriage to a non-OECD immigrant-background man, but due to the low number of second-generation women marrying in their study period (1995-2005), this result failed to reach statistical significance. In the UK, having a native spouse increased the chance of occupational mobility for second-generation immigrants, though to a lesser extent than their first-generation counterparts. And, second-generation women, regardless of their ethnic origin, gained more from intermarrying than men (Muttarak 2011). Similarly, two Danish studies suggest that the effects of partner choice on the labor market outcomes of second-generation immigrants are gendered. First, second-generation women originating from lesser-developed countries who were married to an immigrant-background man deferred the transition from school to work (Nielsen et al. 2003). Second, Çelikaksoy (2007) showed that endogamously married second-generation men had higher employment probabilities than those in exogamous marriages. This latter study found no effects of marrying endogamously on the employment probabilities of the daughters of immigrants, nor the wages of second-generation women and men alike.

Several studies have focused on second-generation immigrants bringing spouses from their countries of origin, a practice that is widespread across Europe (Milewski and Hamel 2010). Such marriages are often characterized by more traditional gender norms (Jakobsen and Liversage 2017; Nadim 2014), and levels of employment and earnings tend to be lower among second-generation immigrants marrying a marriage migrant, particularly for women (Eggebo and Brekke 2019; Mohn 2020).

To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have so far explicitly investigated the influence of partner choice on socioeconomic outcomes across marriage and cohabitation, although research shows that cohabitators tend to be less traditional (Kreidl and Žilinčíková 2021; Smock 2000) and practice more gender-equal roles than those married (Bergsvik et al.

2020).¹ Yet, neither of these studies included the second generation nor immigrants arriving at ages below 15. First, using Swedish register data on immigrant men in parental unions, Dribe and Nystedt (2015) found that the positive income effect of partnering native women was rather similar across marital and cohabiting parental unions. Second, cohabiting with and being married to native Danes had a large and positive effect on the incomes of both male and female immigrants (Elwert and Tegunimataka 2016). Interestingly, this latter study showed that cohabitation increased the incomes of immigrant men regardless of partner choice. This finding implies that cohabitation is selective of immigrant men with better career prospects or that cohabitation is qualitatively different from marriage. How exogamous and endogamous non-marital union formations influence economic outcomes among children of immigrants, however, remains unanswered.

Most studies do not separate between exogamous and endogamous immigrant unions (e.g., Furtado and Theodoropoulos 2009; Justiniano and Valentova 2023; Meng and Gregory 2005) or they exclude unions between immigrants and descendants originating from different countries (e.g., Dribe and Nystedt 2015; Elwert and Tegunimataka 2016). However, the functioning and dynamics of exogamous immigrant-background and migrant-majority couples alike differ from endogamous couples (Wiik, Dommermuth, and Holland 2021), potentially also influencing socioeconomic outcomes.

Theoretical Perspectives on Partner Choice and Labor Market Outcomes

In the following, we discuss possible channels through which partner choice impacts partners' socioeconomic outcomes. We focus on two broad groups of explanations, namely “spillover effects”, such as access to native networks, as well as cultural explanations. To be sure, those who partner exogamously may be selected on unobserved characteristics positively associated with labor market outcomes, other than the country of origin and other measurable variables.

For instance, those partnering natives might be overall better integrated into the receiving country's culture and society, even before unions are formed (see e.g., Dribe and Nystedt 2015; Elwert and Tegunimataka 2016). These forms of human, social and cultural capital may then even grow by partnering natives.

Access to Networks and Knowledge

Access to relevant, large, and “weak” social networks is crucial for getting information about potential job openings (Granovetter 1973; Hansen 1997) and eventually getting a job offer (Petersen, Saporta, and Seidel 2000). By forming intimate relationships, individuals gain access to a variety of networks, both strong and weak, through their partner. These networks can include relatives, friends, and acquaintances (Astone et al. 1999). Having a native partner might also increase institutional knowledge and facilitate practicing the native language in everyday life (Aradhya et al. 2021; Dribe and Nystedt 2015; Meng and Meurs 2009). If couples have children, this could further accelerate the migrant-background partner's bonds to the Norwegian society and make it easier to establish contacts with natives through for instance kindergarten and school settings. This argument is likely applicable to those partnering a migrant-background individual as well, although residential and network segregation may limit their contact with natives. Together, such “spillover effects” of partnering a native may improve the chances of getting a (good) job, and the gains might be highest for those originating from contexts that are more dissimilar from the Norwegian, in terms of language and culture.

To be sure, partnering another immigrant may also have certain benefits, as it may increase access to extrafamilial ethnic networks, improving the chances of getting a job within ethnic niches or self-employment (Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund 2003; Portes 1998). Such jobs are, however, often characterized by poorer working conditions and lower chances of mobility (Portes 1998; Zwysen and Demireva 2020). Overall, the percentage of self-employment in

Norway is low. Seven percent of immigrants are self-employed, compared with 5% of the native-born population, lower than the OECD-average of 12% (OECD/EU 2018). Also, ethnic niches were less important among highly educated second-generation individuals in Norway (Midtbøen and Nadim 2019).

Unlike immigrants arriving as adults, the children of immigrants, and particularly the second generation, have spent all or large parts of their lives in Norway and they speak the native language and share institutional contexts with majority populations, such as educational systems and cultural outlets (Huschek, De Valk, and Liefbroer 2010; Bernhardt et al. 2007; De Valk and Milewski 2011). This could imply that associations between partner choice and labor market outcomes are weaker among the children of immigrants than those who immigrated as adults, as found in the UK (Muttarak 2011). Nonetheless, such generational adaptation may depend on social distance between countries of origin and residence and “the history of each group and its specific profile of vulnerabilities and resource” (Portes and Zhou 1993, 96). Residential and school segregation could, for instance, make it harder for the children of immigrants to meet natives in day-to-day life (Puur, Rahnu, and Tammaru 2022). Many groups of second-generation immigrants in Europe have poorer access to employment than natives (Gracia, Vázquez-Quesada, and Van de Werfhorst 2016; Heath, Rethon, and Kilpi 2013; Hermansen 2013) and some second-generation immigrants, such as Pakistanis and Sri Lankans in Norway (Midtbøen 2016; Midtbøen and Kitterød 2019), face discrimination in the labor market. These structural barriers are not only reducing the opportunities for socioeconomic mobility but also the chances to meet natives through work settings.

Norms, Values and Lifestyles

Partners in endogamous immigrant-background couples usually share language, culture, and religion (Schwartz 2013), and might therefore be more inclined to preserve the practices and

cultures of origin countries than those in exogamous couples. If partners originate in countries with traditional gender roles, as many immigrant groups in Norway do (Kavli 2015), this could result in gender unequal labor divisions within couples. Large shares of the Norwegian immigrant-background population originate from countries in Asia and Africa, many of which are characterized by traditional gender roles, early and universal marriage, and high fertility rates (Blekesaune 2020; De Valk and Milewski 2011; Yeung, Desai, and Jones 2018).

Again, the children of immigrants may be better integrated socially and culturally than the parental generation, though this pattern may be contingent upon social distance between countries of origin and residence (Dribe and Lundh 2011; Portes and Zhou 1993). Indeed, across most origin countries, second-generation youth in Norway are overall less religious (Friberg and Sterri 2021) and have more egalitarian gender role values (Kitterød and Nadim 2020) than the parental generation. Still, norms and behaviors of countries of origin are often transmitted and maintained through links to family and friends in countries of origin as well as first-generation immigrants in countries of residence (Holland and De Valk 2013; Mussino and Ortensi 2018). Religious differences, and particularly between Muslims and non-Muslims (Alba 2005), may create social distance between these groups and a highly secular majority population, as evidenced by low rates of religious intermarriage among both first- and second-generation Muslims in Europe (Drouhot and Nee 2019). Also, religious immigrant women are less often employed and work fewer hours than nonreligious immigrant women, partly due to more traditional gender role attitudes (Kansas and Müller 2021).

So, whereas some groups of childhood migrants and descendants share the norms and behaviors of the native population, others grow up in minority subcultures similar to those in their countries of origin (Kulu et al. 2019). Members of such minority subcultures are probably more likely to partner within their own group, thereby maintaining some of the practices and customs from their countries of origin. Women in these couples may less often

be employed or work fewer hours and instead follow a “motherhood track”, forming families early and having larger families, further reducing their mobility chances (Kulu et al. 2019; Van den Berg, Neels, and Wood 2021). Men in such endogamous migrant-background couples may more often than those in exogamous unions take on a main breadwinner role.

Study Context

Norway became a country of net-immigration in the late 1960s with the arrival of labor migrants from Pakistan, Turkey, India, and Morocco. In the mid-1970s, the country implemented a block on non-Nordic migration, before favoring refugee and family migration from the 1980s onwards (Brochmann and Kjelstadli 2008). In the wake of the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, Norway saw a significant increase in labor migration from new Eastern European member-states, such as Poland and Lithuania. Currently, about half of the migrant-background population (i.e., immigrants and the native-born children of two immigrants) have roots in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, whereas one-third are of Eastern-European origin (Statistics Norway 2023a). As of the beginning of 2023, there were 213,000 second-generation individuals in Norway (i.e., native born by two immigrants), among whom one-third were aged 16 or older and 64% originated from Asia (including Turkey) and Africa and 27% were of Eastern European origin (Statistics Norway 2023a).

Norway boasts high employment rates, and in 2019, only 3.7% of the total population aged 15-74 faced unemployment, compared to 6.7% in the EU (Eurostat 2022a). Norwegian women have increased their participation in the labor market throughout the last decades, and 77% of them are gainfully employed, compared to 67% in the EU (Eurostat 2022b). Although most Norwegian parental couples are dual-earners, mothers are more often working part time, and in only 5% of couples, their incomes exceed that of men (Bergsvik et al 2020).

Many second-generation immigrants in Norway, particularly women, perform well in the educational system, often outperforming their native peers (Steinkellner 2017). Nonetheless, the children of immigrants, especially those originating from lesser developed countries, face a higher unemployment risk than Norwegian natives (Birkelund et al. 2014; Larsen, Rogne, and Birkelund 2018). In 2017, 5% of second generation young adults aged 15 to 34 were unemployed, compared with 7% of childhood migrants and 3% of those native born with native-born parents (OECD/EU 2018).

Immigrants with longer durations of residence and the second generation are overall better integrated on the labor market than recently arriving immigrants, though there are important differences across countries of origin and reason for immigration (Bratsberg, Raaum, and Røed 2017). For example, while European labor immigrants typically achieve employment and income rates similar to those of the majority population after 12 years residing in Norway, refugees and family migrants from African and Asian countries do not generally attain these levels (Brovold 2020).

Hypotheses

We formulate the following hypotheses:

First, we expect that the children of immigrants partnering majority Norwegians have more favorable economic outcomes than those partnering another migrant or descendant (*Hypothesis 1*). Evidence substantiates this hypothesis, suggesting that increased access to native networks and culture, institutional knowledge, and other spillover effects provide better chances on the labor market. On average, natives earn more than immigrant-background individuals, contributing to higher household incomes for those who partner with natives. We know less about exogamous migrant-background unions, likely a diverse group that we expect to fall in between those partnering endogamously and those partnering natives.

Second, partner choice is selective by migration background and socioeconomic status. Beyond income differences by partner choice at union formation (initial heterogeneity), we anticipate that disparities in human, social, and cultural capital, which may be amplified by partner choice, will influence labor market outcomes after forming a union (*Hypothesis 2*).

Last, we expect that the effects of partner choice on economic outcomes after union formation are most pronounced among women (*Hypothesis 3*). Compared to Norway, many cultures of origin have more traditional breadwinning norms. Therefore, the daughters of immigrants with immigrant-background partners, especially from the same country of origin, have poorer trajectories in employment and individual incomes than those partnering natives. Given that men from the majority population usually earn more than majority women, the household income premium of having a native partner will be higher for immigrant-background women than immigrant-background men.

Furthermore, as those who are married or those originating from countries culturally distant from Norway may be driving these patterns, we aim to determine whether the findings hold across marital and cohabiting unions and global regions of origin.

Analytical Strategy

To analyze associations between couple types and economic outcomes, we used linear regression models (OLS) on the natural logarithms of inflation-adjusted annual individual and household incomes. We applied linear probability models (i.e., OLS with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors) to assess the probability of being employed. All models were estimated separately for men and women, and they take the following (simplified) form:

$$(1) Y_{it} = \alpha z_i + \beta x_{it} + \gamma P_i + \delta D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where Y_{it} denotes our outcomes for individual i in period t , z_i is a vector for time-constant independent variables, x_{it} is a vector for time-variant independent variables, P_i is the type of

partner, D_{it} are year dummies for union duration measuring time since union formation, and ε_{it} is the error term.

To account for selection into different partner types and heterogeneity at union formation, in a next step, we included couple fixed effects and interacted partner type with union duration assessing changes in employment and incomes after the union formation. Although we have follow-up information to a maximum of fourteen years after union formation, we present results for up to ten years due to a relatively low number of observations with longer durations. These models take the following (simplified) form:

$$(2) Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta x_{it} + \gamma PD_{it} + \delta D_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Where α_i is the fixed effect capturing the time-invariant couple characteristics, and PD_{it} represents the interaction between partner type and union duration.

By using longitudinal data and including the couple fixed effects (α_i), we can control for all time-invariant factors at the couple level. Thus, if effects are found, these capture how the development of economic outcomes after union formation differs across partner types.

Data and Variables

We used longitudinal data from Norwegian population registers, with demographic information such as marriage, age, dates of migration, gender, as well as individuals' own and their parents' country of birth. In 2005, the Norwegian population registers introduced a unique address identifier for each dwelling, making it possible to identify opposite-sex cohabiting unions from that year onwards. Cohabiting couples are defined as a man and a woman aged 18 years or older residing in the same dwelling (shared housing arrangements excluded), who are not relatives or married and whose age difference is less than 16 years. If couples have common children, this latter rule on age difference does not apply (Falnes-

Dalheim 2009). We supplemented these population data with annual information on income and education available through 2019, facilitated through a system of universal ID numbers.

Sample

We focused on the total population of opposite-sex marital and cohabiting unions formed between 2006 and 2018, including an index person aged 20 to 55 upon union formation who was either a second-generation (i.e., native-born with foreign-born parents) or childhood immigrant (i.e., immigrated prior to age 18). We did not apply any restrictions to the partners' age nor their migration background. However, to secure full information on the duration of unions, we only included index persons and partners who were residing in Norway in the year preceding union formation. Restricting our analyses to the children of immigrants (i.e., immigrants arriving prior to age 18 as well as the second generation), we only considered those exposed to the Norwegian partnership market. Observations were censored upon any separation or the outmigration or death of one or both partners. Our analysis sample consists of 49,692 unique couples (244,156 couple-years), among whom 64.7% were cohabiting and 35.3% were married at union formation.

Outcomes

Based on data on annual labor income (i.e., the sum of income from wages and self-employment), we first assessed these two outcomes:

a) The index person's *probability of being employed*: We defined those having an annual labor income exceeding two times the annual social security basic amount (known as the "G" value in Norwegian social security system) as employed.² For example, 2G was equivalent to 176,740 Norwegian Kroner (NOK) in 2014, amounting to approximately 17,500 US\$;

b) The index person's *individual labor income* before taxes: We measured the income continuously in whole 1000s of Norwegian Kroner (NOK), for all years inflation-adjusted to 2014-prices. Given a highly skewed income distribution, we log transformed this variable;

Last, we investigate the following outcome:

c) *Household income*: We defined this variable as the sum of each partner's annual gross total pensionable incomes (i.e., the sum of labour income and all taxable income replacements during periods of parental or sick leave, or during occupational rehabilitation). The household income was used continuously, adjusted for inflation and logged.

Main Independent Variable

We assessed *partner choice* in terms of the partner's migrant background as well as their own (for immigrants) or their parents' (for the second generation) country of birth.³ We categorized partners into: (1) a majority individual (i.e., native born with two native-born parents); (2) an immigrant-background individual from a different country of origin (i.e., exogamous); and (3) an immigrant-background individual from the same country of origin (i.e., endogamous).

Controls

We incorporated a time-varying dummy separating between those who were cohabiting (0) or *married* (1) during the observation. We included *union duration* as a set of year dummies.

Global *regions of origin* measured the index persons' own (for childhood immigrants) or their parents' (for the second generation) countries of birth, grouped into six categories: (1) Nordic and Western European countries, including North America, Australia, and New Zealand, (2) Eastern Europe, (3) Asia and rest of Oceania, (4) Sub-Saharan Africa, (5) Middle-East and North-Africa (including Turkey; MENA), and (6) South and Middle America.

Additional controls included *age at union formation* (with a squared term to capture non-linearities). We further grouped the *age difference* between the partners into three categories: Partner > 2 years older (1), up to 2 years age difference (2), and partner > 2 years younger (3). We included *age at arrival* in Norway as a numerical variable, ranging from 0 (including the second generation) to 17 years. A time-varying dummy measured whether *at least one child* was residing in the household (1 = yes, 0 = no). We also controlled for the *education level* of the index person in each annual observation, differentiating between (1) primary (< 10 years), (2) secondary (10 to 12 years), (3) tertiary (> 12 years), and (4) missing education. Additionally, a time-varying dummy measured whether individuals were currently *in education* (1) or not (0). Last, in recognition that educational assortative mating influences income differences across households (Eeckhout and Stanfors 2021), we included a time-varying variable measuring *couples' education*, with categories: (1) homogamous, (2) partner lower, (3) partner higher, and (4) missing.

Stratification Variables

We conducted subsample tests for *union type* (married or cohabiting upon union formation) and global *region of origin* of the index person. To ensure enough observations in each category, we collapsed individuals into the following three broad groups: (1) Europe (Western and Eastern), plus North America, Australia, and New Zealand, (2) Asia, including the rest of Oceania, and (3) MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa. Because we could not easily collapse them with any of the other world regions and they were too few to form a cohesive group, we chose to exclude the children of immigrants from South-American countries ($N= 2,702$, 5.4%) from the subsample analysis.

Results

Descriptive Results

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics, measured in the year of union formation by partner types and sex. As seen at the bottom of this table, 42% of women and 39% of men had a native partner, while 38% of women and 41% of men were in endogamous unions. The remaining 20% of both sexes were in exogamous migrant-background unions. Regarding our outcome variables, the children of immigrants with a native partner were more often employed at union formation than those in exogamous migrant-background unions. However, women (66%) and men (81%) in endogamous unions were most frequently working. Those partnered with natives had higher annual individual labor and household incomes than those with a migrant-background partner already upon union formation. Among men, however, those in endogamous unions had the highest labor incomes at union formation. On average, women had lower individual but higher household incomes than men, regardless of partner type.

[Table 1 about here]

Table 1 also highlights several sociodemographic differences across partner types.⁴ For instance, women (88%) and men (92%) with native partners were more often cohabiting at union formation than their counterparts in exogamous (72% of women, 68% of men) and particularly endogamous (38% of women, 33% of men) unions. Among women and men with native partners, 50% and 44% respectively were of Nordic or European origin, whereas 52% of men and 43% of women in endogamous unions originated from an Asian country.⁵

Figure 1 plots the employment shares and mean incomes (in inflation-adjusted 1000s of NOK) for up to ten years after union formation. The children of immigrants with a native partner were more often employed (Panel A) and had higher individual (Panel B) and household (Panel C) incomes during our observation than those with a migrant-background

partner, be it exogamous or endogamous. To be sure, for employment and individual income, these patterns were first apparent after two (women) to four (men) years.

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 clearly shows that employment increased rapidly within the first three to five years among those with a native partner or a migrant-background partner from another country. Conversely, the employment rate among those in endogamous unions exhibited only minor changes. Across all groups, both individual and household incomes increased with union duration. However, for endogamous couples, the income growth was less pronounced.

Differences across partner types in employment and individual, and particularly household, incomes were larger among women than men. For instance, after 10 years, those with native partners had household incomes that were on average around 350,000 NOK (women) and 100,000 NOK (men) higher than their counterparts in endogamous unions. Last, Figure 1 shows that, except for men's employment, those in exogamous unions formed a middle group between those partnered endogamously and those partnered with natives.

The Overall Association Between Partner Choice and Economic Outcomes

Table 2 presents results from gender-separated regression models for employment (Panel A), as well as individual (Panel B) and household (Panel C) incomes across all union durations. This table presents two sets of models: one controlling only for union duration (Model 1) and the other including the full set of controls (Model 2, see Online Appendix Table 1 for the full model results).

For employment, we first observe that women with migrant-background partners, be it exogamous or endogamous, were significantly less likely to be employed than women with a native partner. Controlling for age at arrival, regions of origin, union type, the presence of children, age, age difference between partners, education level and enrolment, and relative

education in Model 2, these women were 2% less likely to be employed compared to women with a native partner. Among men, those in exogamous migrant-background unions were 3% less likely to be employed than men with native partners. However, among men in endogamous unions, the coefficient was small and marginally statistically significant ($p=.07$).

Regarding individual labor income, women and men in endogamous unions earned respectively 6% and 2% less than their counterparts with a native partner, controlling for the other variables included in Model 2. The corresponding income reduction by partnering with a migrant-background partner originating from a different country (i.e., exogamous) amounted to 3% (women) and 4% (men).

Turning to the models for household income in the lower panel of Table 2, the “penalty” for having a migrant-background partner was largest among women. Specifically, women in exogamous and endogamous migrant-background unions had 13% and 15% lower household incomes than women with native partners, controlling for the other included variables in Model 2. The comparable reductions in the household incomes of men with migrant-background partners amounted to 8% (exogamous) and 10% (endogamous), net of the other included variables (Model 2).

Fixed Effects Results

Our findings thus far confirm that there are considerable differences in employment and income levels between couple types, even after controlling for relevant covariates. As shown in the descriptive statistics (Table 1 and Figure 1), many of these differences were already apparent at the time of union formation. To single out diverging developments after union formation, we ran fixed effects models assessing only changes in employment and income after union formation. Figure 2 presents the results from these analyses, showing the economic trajectories for those in endogamous and exogamous migrant-background unions,

using the development among those with a native partner as a reference point (horizontal lines). Online Appendix Tables 2 (women) and 3 (men) detail the model results from these fixed effects regressions.

[Figure 2 about here]

First, we see from Figure 2 that the developments in economic outcomes among women in exogamous unions did not differ significantly from the developments among daughters of immigrants with a native partner. The only exception was in terms of employment; women in exogamous migrant-background unions demonstrated a significantly poorer employment trend than women with a native partner 2, 5, and 7 years after union formation (see Online Appendix Table 2 for details). Women in endogamous unions, on the other hand, had a significantly weaker development in employment and individual income than those with native partners across all years. Interestingly, removing all time-constant factors from the equation, the household incomes of women in endogamous unions demonstrated a more favorable development than women with native partners for 8 years after union formation.

We observe a similar pattern among men. However, for men, the choice between an endogamous or exogamous migrant-background partner appears to have less impact on economic outcomes post-union formation. In terms of employment and individual income, both these couple types exhibited significantly poorer growth than men with a native partner, although the effects were most pronounced after 3 years, and less severe than among endogamously partnered women. Regarding household incomes, endogamously partnered men experienced a significantly more favorable growth compared to those with native partners during the first 7 years following union formation.

Testing for Heterogeneity by Union Type and Region of Origin

As shown in our descriptive results (Table 1), substantially larger shares of women (62%) and men (67%) in endogamous unions were married than those with native partners (12% of women, 8% of men). To test if patterns also are present among cohabiting couples, or if those married are mostly driving our main results, we ran additional fixed effects models separately for married and cohabiting couples (see Figure 3).

[Figure 3 about here]

As Figure 3 clearly indicates, married individuals are primarily steering our main findings, particularly among women (left side of Panel A). Specifically, women in endogamous marriages exhibited significantly poorer developments in employment, and after three years of marriage, also in individual income. Yet, endogamously married women experienced a positive development in household incomes during the first 8 years of marriage, replicating our main finding. We observe a similar pattern among endogamously married men (left side of Panel B), although the effects were generally smaller compared to their female counterparts, particularly regarding employment trajectories. Furthermore, men in exogamous marriages had a poorer development in individual income compared to men married to native women after 4 years of marriage.

Among cohabitators, there were fewer differences in economic outcomes by partner types. Nevertheless, similar to their married counterparts, women (right side of Panel A) and men (right side of Panel B) in endogamous cohabiting relationships displayed poorer employment trajectories and a weaker development in individual income compared to those cohabiting with natives. Among men, the differences were not statistically significant for unions of the longest durations (above 9 years), and among women, effects only reached statistical significance in certain years after union formation.

Interestingly, Figure 3 reveals minimal variation across partner types in cohabiting couples' household incomes. Contrary to the positive trend observed for migrant-background marriages, the development was, in fact, negative compared to the development in households with a native partner. However, it is worth noting that these negative trends were not statistically significant at conventional levels for most durations.

We further investigated whether those originating from countries most culturally distant from Norway influence the main patterns. To do this, we ran separate fixed effects analyses by three broad world regions of origin. Figure 4 provides the results from these models, separately for women (Panel A) and men (Panel B).

[Figure 4 about here]

First, in terms of employment trajectories, women and men of Asian (middle columns), and Middle-Eastern and African (right columns) backgrounds who endogamously partnered exhibited significantly weaker developments compared to their counterparts with native partners. The effects were most pronounced among women, particularly women originating from countries in the Middle-East and North-Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Panel A, right column). However, among men of Western and Eastern European origin including the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Panel B, left column), those in endogamous unions also experienced weaker employment growth than similar men partnering with natives.

Second, we observe the most pronounced differences in individual income growth by partner types among men and women originating from European countries as well as among men, and particularly women, of MENA and Sub-Saharan African origin. In these groups, those partnering endogamously had significantly poorer developments compared to those with native partners. Among women and men of Asian origin, there were few significant differences in income developments by type of partner.

Lastly, as Figure 4 illustrates, only Asian-origin women in endogamous relationships had a positive development in household income following union formation, compared to their counterparts who partnered with native men. Conversely, men originating from Europe and MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa in endogamous partnerships witnessed significant growth in their household incomes following the formation of their unions, as opposed to men of the same origins with native partners.

Additional Robustness Checks

In addition, using the same fixed effects models as before, we performed several robustness checks on our choice of outcome variables (results available on request).

First, in our analysis individuals with an income above 2G were defined as employed. In the Norwegian context, this corresponds to a typical part-time income or a very low income from full-time employment (Statistics Norway 2023d). Some prior studies have used even lower thresholds for employment, encompassing relatively marginal employment (Hermansen 2013; Mohn 2020; Ugreninov and Turner 2023). Therefore, in supplemental analyses, we lowered the threshold for employment to 1G. The results from these models were similar to our original findings. However, among women, the effects were overall weaker, though still statistically significant at conventional levels, for those partnering endogamously.

Second, in our analyses of individual labor income, we included all individuals with positive incomes. Several prior studies on this topic have focused on those with labor incomes above a certain threshold (e.g., Dribe and Nystedt 2015; Mohn 2020). In alternative models, we restricted our sample to individuals who were gainfully employed, defined as those with incomes above two times the social security base figure ($N= 39,556$, 79.6% of the full sample). These models corroborated our main findings. Using this limited, and thereby less heterogeneous, sample yielded slightly smaller but statistically more robust estimates. In this

sample, both women and men in exogamous migrant-background unions had significantly lower incomes than those partnering natives.

Finally, to capture households' total disposable incomes, and thus their purchasing power, we used the partners' total incomes—including taxable income replacements—in our main models. In alternative models, we defined household income simply as the sum of both partners' labor incomes. Among women, the results from these models corroborated our main findings. However, when removing transfers from the household income equation, we observed that the positive effects found for men partnering endogamously became weaker and statistically insignificant for most years. In other words, for men, it is not only their own or their partners' labor incomes that drive the household income premium of being in an endogamous partnership. Instead, income replacements seem to play a substantial role in these households.

Summary and Conclusions

Researchers have long considered immigrant-native marriages as strong evidence of integration of immigrants into receiving societies and diminishing social distance between natives and immigrants (Alba 2005; Song 2009). Yet, relatively few empirical studies have explicitly investigated the actual consequences of partner choice (Schwartz 2013; Van Bavel 2012). Studies that have assessed the economic implications of partner choice confirm that immigrants partnering natives have higher labor market participation and incomes than those partnering endogamously (e.g., Dribe and Nystedt 2015; Elwert and Tegunimataka 2016; Meng and Gregory 2005). Most studies on this topic have focused on immigrants in marital unions. There is a lack of knowledge on partner choice and economic outcomes among the children of immigrants and across marital and non-marital unions. The second generation and immigrants arriving as children are generally better integrated into their receiving societies

than immigrants arriving as adults (Heath et al. 2008; Hermansen 2017). Nonetheless, as for the parental generation, many of these individuals encounter difficulties when entering the labor market (Bratsberg et al. 2017; Hermansen 2013; Midtbøen 2016).

Using Norwegian register data on the total population of marital and cohabiting unions formed between 2006 through 2018 that include at least one second-generation immigrant or a childhood immigrant, we assessed associations between exogamous and endogamous partner choices and economic outcomes. Norway is known as a country with relatively low earning inequality and high gender equality (Kitterød and Nadim 2020). The Norwegian welfare state has several policies aimed at increasing the education and labor market participation of individuals with an immigrant background, such as the Introduction program for immigrants (see e.g. Ugreninov and Turner 2023), potentially lessening the impact of partner choice compared to some other countries. Norway's welfare regime also makes it easier for both women and men to balance family and working life, regardless of migration background. Subsidized childcare services and paid parental leave have played instrumental roles in increasing women's labor market participation as well as men's involvement in the family (Bergsvik et al. 2020).

Nonetheless, even in Norway, there are systematic income differences both by gender and migration background, and as shown in the current study, partner choice has implications for labor market outcomes. Examining three outcomes, namely employment, individual income, and household income, we were able to capture different aspects of economic integration. First, employment measures participation in the workforce, individual income captures individual career success, and household income captures household purchasing power.

We first expected that the children of immigrants partnering majority Norwegians to a larger degree would participate in the labor market, get access to better paid jobs, and have higher household incomes than those partnering another migrant or descendant (Hypothesis

1). In line with these expectations, the children of immigrants partnering natives overall were more often employed and earned higher incomes across the observation period than those with a migrant-background partner. Averaged over all observation years, women partnering a migrant-background man were 2% less likely to be employed, while men in exogamous migrant-background unions were 3% less likely to be employed, than those with native partners. Women and men in endogamous unions also earned respectively 6% and 2% less, whereas those in exogamous unions had 3% (women) and 4% (men) lower labor incomes, than those with native partners. Women in migrant-background unions had 13% to 15% lower household incomes, while men partnering with migrant-background women saw their household incomes reduced by roughly 10%.

Together, these results confirm that there are important differences in economic outcomes across partner types, even among the children of immigrants, who were raised and often born in Norway: Averaged over all observation years, those with a native partner are more often employed, have higher incomes and more income disposable in their household than those partnering other migrants and descendants. However, these results also reflect selection into different partner types and heterogeneity at union formation, and are thus not effects of partner choice *per se*.

We therefore ran fixed effects models solely considering changes in employment and incomes after union formation. Our hypothesis was that partner choice would impact these economic outcomes beyond the initial selection, due to spillover effects and consolidated cultural differences (Hypothesis 2). Together, the results from these analyses verified that children of immigrants who partnered endogamously experienced less favorable employment and individual income trajectories in the years following union formation, compared to those partnering natives. These results imply that those partnering endogamously get fewer spillover effects from their partner than those partnering natives. Such spillover effects may

involve access to broader networks, but also cultural integration, which may be highly useful when entering the labor market. Furthermore, while endogamous partnering could enhance access to ethnic networks and niches, such networks might also provide access to jobs with limited mobility opportunities and involve “negative social capital” (Portes 1998).

Contrary to our expectations, we saw that the household income over time developed more positively after entering an endogamous union, thereby enhancing these households’ purchasing power and living standard. However, this finding cannot be viewed in isolation from the initial low levels of household income among the children of immigrants in migrant-background unions. In absolute terms, those in endogamous unions consistently had lower household incomes throughout our study but showed greater relative growth post-union formation compared to those partnering natives. This was true for men and women alike, though effects were most visible among women.

To be sure, we based our household income measure on both partners’ total incomes, which included taxable income transfers (e.g., parental or sick leave) in addition to their labor incomes. In additional analyses using both partners’ labor incomes only, the positive effects for men partnering endogamously, observed in our main model, became weaker and statistically insignificant for most years. That is, income replacements seem to play a substantial role in the household incomes of sons of immigrants partnering endogamously. In contrast, the findings from the models using either total income or labor income only were consistent for daughters of immigrants in endogamous unions, suggesting that their household income levels were less dependent on these income transfers, and more directly tied to the labor incomes of their men. These findings suggest that in endogamous couples, traditional gender practices prevail: women often “marry up” and follow a “motherhood track” (Kulu et al. 2019), while men take on roles as main breadwinners.

Regarding other patterns by gender, results revealed important nuances and were mostly in line with our expectations (Hypothesis 3). First, due to traditional breadwinning norms in many countries of origin, we hypothesized that the daughters of immigrants partnering other migrants and descendants, and particularly those partnering endogamously, would have poorer economic trajectories post union formation than those partnering natives, and that partner choice would be more important for the employment and income developments of women than men. Indeed, our results confirmed that the daughters of immigrants in endogamous unions had the poorest developments in employment and individual income.

Separate analyses by global regions of origin showed that these results, particularly for employment, were most pronounced among women originating from countries in MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa. Although we found similar effects among men, they were overall smaller and less statistically robust. These findings are in line with earlier research showing that partner choice matters more for the employment and occupational trajectories of second-generation women than men (Çelikaksoy 2007; Muttarak 2011; Nielsen et al. 2003). These findings indicate that partner choice has consequences for participation in the labor market and individual and household incomes, both due to persisting ethnic and gender differences in chances on the labor and partner markets, as well as differences in gender specialization within couples.

At the same time, our results also reflected the selective nature of cohabitation, particularly among immigrant-background populations. In line with earlier Norwegian findings (Wiik et al. 2021), a larger share of those partnering natives were cohabiting whereas endogamous couples more often were married. The effects of partner choice on economic trajectories were almost completely driven by married couples. There were few differences among those in cohabiting unions, though women and men in endogamous cohabiting unions had a slightly poorer development in employment than those cohabiting with natives. Also, endogamously

cohabiting men had a weaker income trajectory following union formation than men cohabiting with natives.

The children of immigrants partnering another migrant-background individual, and particularly those married to a partner originating from the same country, might to a larger degree preserve practices from their origin countries than those partnering natives. Studies on marriage migrants show that such marriages are often characterized by traditional gender norms (Jakobsen and Liversage 2017; Nadim 2014), and that levels of employment, educational achievement, and earnings tend to be lower among both marriage migrants' themselves and their second-generation spouses than those in other marriages (Eggebø and Brekke 2019; Mohn 2020; Nielsen et al. 2009). Our results indicate similar dynamics among endogamous marriages formed in Norway.

Meanwhile, exogamous migrant-background couples comprise an even more diverse group with much internal variation. As shown in our sub-sample analyses, there were some important differences across union types and regions of origin. For instance, men who married exogamously had a poorer income development than men marrying natives, similar to those in endogamous marriages. We found no such effects among those cohabiting, implying that those cohabiting exogamously are more akin to natives. Regarding regions of origin, those of European origin in exogamous unions had poorer employment (men) and income (women) developments. Further, limiting our analyses to those employed only, both women and men in exogamous migrant-background unions had significantly lower individual incomes than those partnering natives. These supplementary findings testify to the importance of also including exogamous couples when studying the economic outcomes of partner choice, even though they constitute a highly heterogeneous group.

In the current study, we were able to investigate the influence of partner choice on employment and earnings among the children of immigrants from many countries of origin in

marital and non-marital unions. Despite these strengths, the data used here contained no information on language proficiency or ethnicity, nor attitudes and values. Please also note that our outcomes for employment and individual income, based on annual labor income, may reflect either hours worked, wages, or both. Further, to ensure that we had complete union histories and only considered individuals that were exposed to the Norwegian partner market, we focused solely on unions formed in Norway and did not consider the effects of bringing a partner from abroad.

Like in other European countries (Drouhot and Nee 2019; Heath et al. 2008), the second generation in Norway is still relatively young. This fact is mirrored in our sample, which had an average age of below 30 years, with most couples being observed for approximately four years after union formation. The size of our sample also prevented us from analyzing couples comprising partners from individual countries of origin, or from applying more fine-grained regions of origin. Given the rapid changes in the size and composition of this group, future research should consider studying unions of longer durations and focus on individual countries of origin. This would facilitate an even deeper understanding of the economic implications of partner choice.

Our contribution to the existing literature was threefold: First, we added to the knowledge base on the economic outcomes of partner choice by using nationally representative longitudinal data on all co-residential unions, marital as well as non-marital. Using these data and fixed effects models we were able to assess effects of partner choice on three different economic outcomes for several years following union formation. Second, we focused on the children of immigrants (i.e., immigrants arriving as children or teens and the second generation), a hitherto little studied group when it comes to economic outcomes of partner choice. Studying the link between partner choice and the economic outcomes of these individuals, who were socialized within their countries of residence, is key for understanding

long-term structural integration. Third, we separated between endogamous and exogamous immigrant-background unions thereby extending the scope compared to previous studies.

To conclude, the findings of this study confirmed that even among the children of immigrants, who were raised and often born in Norway, partner choice has implications for economic outcomes: The children of immigrants partnering endogamously had a weaker development in employment and individual income than those partnering natives. Overall, results were most pronounced among those married, and more evident for women than men. Taken together our findings testify not only of structural barriers children of immigrants face on the labor market but are likely also results of gendered practices and socio-economically selective partner choices.

Notes

1 The studies by Justiniano and Valentova (2023), and Muttarak (2011) used survey data on married and cohabiting individuals. However, due to the phrasing of the questions and limited sample sizes, they were unable to distinguish between the types of unions. Similarly, Meng and Gregory (2005) and Meng and Meurs (2009) incorporated “de facto marriages” in their samples but failed to define this type of marriage or to identify it as a distinct union type in their analyses.

2 Using the social security basic amount with different cut-off points for defining employment is standard in prior research on Norwegian data (e.g., Birkelund et al. 2014; Hermansen 2013; Mohn 2020). As a robustness check, we also use 1G as a cut-of-point for being employed.

3 In cases where parents of second-generation individuals were from different countries, we used the information on the mother’s country of birth (Dzamarija 2014).

4 Together, 19% of migrant-background partners’ education was missing (22% of immigrant partners and 2% of second-generation partners). Missing education is largely attributed to immigrants who have not yet received education in Norway, or whose education has not been recognized by the Norwegian authorities (Bjugstad and Holseter 2016).

5 Among migrant-background partners, 88% were foreign born and 12% were native born. There were no major differences across endogamous and exogamous unions, or between men and women (data not shown).

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics by partner types measured at union formation. Second-generation and childhood migrant women ($N=24,828$) and men ($N=24,864$).

Variables	Native partner		Exogamous		Endogamous	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
Employed (1=yes)	61.5	71.6	57.8	68.5	66.1	80.9
Mean annual labor income ^a	262.8 (212.0)	352.8 (344.6)	241.1 (204.0)	330.4 (275.4)	258.3 (193.5)	385.3 (262.4)
Mean household income ^a	770.8 (498.7)	709.9 (468.1)	633.3 (350.8)	620.5 (359.9)	623.4 (331.4)	607.1 (331.7)
Union type (married=1)	11.6	7.5	28.2	31.7	61.7	66.8
Mean age at arrival	6.8(5.8)	6.6(5.8)	7.8(6.1)	8.3(6.3)	7.4(6.4)	8.7(6.4)
Native born (1=yes)	25.1	26.3	21.7	21.6	29.1	23.4
Global region of origin						
Nordics & Western Europe ^b	24.8	23.8	10.2	10.8	2.3	1.5
Eastern Europe	24.2	20.4	23.9	20.7	18.7	16.2
Asia ^c	23.2	20.3	23.3	28.8	43.4	51.6
MENA	11.8	17.5	22.6	22.8	21.5	19.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	7.4	8.3	14.5	11.9	12.2	9.7
South America	8.6	9.8	5.5	5.0	1.9	1.5
Partner's region of origin						
Norway	100.0	100.0	-	-	-	-
Nordics & Western Europe ^b	-	-	20.1	18.0	2.3	1.5
Eastern Europe	-	-	22.0	26.9	18.7	16.2
Asia ^c	-	-	17.8	21.0	43.4	51.6
MENA	-	-	22.6	17.6	21.5	19.4
Sub-Saharan Africa	-	-	13.0	12.0	12.2	9.7
South America	-	-	4.5	4.5	1.9	1.5
Education level						
Primary	27.0	35.7	35.0	41.6	33.6	43.3
Secondary	32.0	34.5	30.9	30.5	32.9	31.3
Tertiary	39.8	28.7	32.1	25.6	30.2	23.1
Missing	1.2	1.1	2.0	2.3	3.4	2.3
Partners' relative education						
Homogamous	40.6	42.2	34.3	33.3	32.8	31.2
Partner lower	24.5	16.9	21.9	15.5	22.1	13.8
Partner higher	33.1	39.4	27.6	32.8	25.6	28.7
Missing (one or both)	1.8	1.5	16.2	18.4	19.5	26.4
In education (1=yes)	15.7	9.1	13.9	9.0	10.0	4.0
Child(ren) (1=yes)	27.5	29.4	32.9	32.1	42.7	39.9
Mean age	28.0 (6.6)	29.0 (6.4)	27.5 (5.8)	29.1 (6.3)	26.7 (5.0)	29.5 (5.7)
Partners' age difference						
Partner > 2 years younger	9.6	34.2	11.7	38.7	6.4	48.9
+/- 2 years	43.9	48.5	38.8	40.5	43.5	43.6
Partner > 2 years older	46.5	17.3	49.5	20.8	50.1	7.5
Mean observation time, years	4.1(3.1)	4.0(3.0)	3.9(2.9)	3.9(2.9)	4.7(3.2)	4.7(3.2)
<i>N</i>	10,392	9,737	4,978	5,004	9,458	10,123
% of women/ men	41.9%	39.2%	20.0%	20.1%	38.1%	40.7%

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. ^a In whole 1000s of fixed 2014 Norwegian Kroner (NOK). ^b Including the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. ^c Including countries in rest of Oceania.


Table 2. Regression results for employment, individual income, and household income for women ($N=24,828$) and men ($N=24,864$).

	Women				Men			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 1		Model 2	
A. Employment	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se
Partner (native=ref.)								
Minority, exogam	-0.05***	0.00	-0.02***	0.00	-0.04***	0.00	-0.03**	0.00
Minority, endogam	-0.06***	0.00	-0.02***	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01 [†]	0.00
Constant	0.66	0.00	-0.16	0.02	0.76	0.00	0.48	0.02
R^2	0.01		0.30		0.01		0.22	
Controls	No		Yes		No		Yes	
<i>N</i> couple years	122,728				121,428			
B. Individual income	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se
Partner (native=ref.)								
Minority, exogam	-0.10***	0.01	-0.03***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01
Minority, endogam	-0.17***	0.01	-0.06***	0.01	-0.05***	0.01	-0.02**	0.01
Constant	5.40	0.01	3.07	0.06	5.69	0.01	4.30	0.06
R^2	0.02		0.29		0.03		0.23	
Controls	No		Yes		No		Yes	
<i>N</i> couple years	109,431				112,913			
C. Household income	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se	<i>b</i>	se
Partner (native=ref.)								
Minority, exogam	-0.19***	0.00	-0.13***	0.00	-0.16***	0.01	-0.08***	0.00
Minority, endogam	-0.23***	0.00	-0.15***	0.00	-0.22***	0.00	-0.10***	0.11
Constant	6.51	0.00	4.92	0.03	6.45	0.00	4.78	0.04
R^2	0.09		0.26		0.07		0.25	
Controls	No		Yes		No		Yes	
<i>N</i> couple years	121,631				120,270			

Note: Marital and cohabiting unions formed 2006 through 2018 including at least one second generation or childhood migrant aged 20 to 55 upon union formation. All models controlled for union duration. Models 2 were additionally controlled for global regions of origin, age at arrival, age (squared), age difference between partners, marriage during observation, presence of any children in the household, education level and enrollment, and couple's relative education.


[†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure 1. Shares employed and mean individual and household incomes for up to 10 years after union formation by partner types and union duration. Married and cohabiting women ($N=24,828$) and men ($N=24,864$).




Note: Marital and cohabiting unions formed 2006 through 2018 including at least one second generation or childhood migrant aged 20 to 55 upon union formation.

Figure 2. Fixed effect regressions with interactions between partner type and union duration. Separate models for women (N=24,828) and men (N=24,864).




Note: Marital and cohabiting unions formed 2006 through 2018 including at least one second generation or childhood migrant aged 20 to 55 upon union formation. All models controlled for age (squared), presence of children in the household, education level and enrollment, couple’s relative education, and transition to marriage among cohabitators.

Figure 3. Fixed effect regressions with interactions between partner type and union duration. Separate models for married and cohabiting women ($N=24,828$, 33% married) and men ($N=24,864$, 36% married).



Note: Marital and cohabiting unions formed 2006 through 2018 including at least one second generation or childhood migrant aged 20 to 55 upon union formation. All models controlled for age (squared), presence of children in the household, education level and enrollment, couple's relative education, and transition to marriage among cohabitators.

Figure 4. Fixed effect regressions with interactions between partner type and union duration. Separate models for women and men by world regions of origin: Europe^a ($N=7,637$ men/ $8,776$ women), Asia^b ($N=8,636$ men/ $7,671$ women), and MENA^c and Sub-Saharan Africa ($N=7,203$ men/ $7,031$ women).



Note: Marital and cohabiting unions formed 2006-2018 with at least one 2nd gen. or childhood migrant aged 20 to 55 upon union formation. All models controlled for age (squared), presence of children in the household, education level and enrollment, couple’s relative education, and transition to marriage. ^aIncl. the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. ^bIncl. rest of Oceania. ^cMENA= Middle-East and North-Africa, incl. Turkey.

Appendix Table 1. Results from full models of employment, individual and household incomes. Separate models for women and men. Marital and cohabiting unions formed 2006 through 2018 including at least one second generation or childhood migrant aged 20 to 55 upon union formation ($N=49,962$).

	A. Employment				B. Individual income				C. Household income			
	Women		Men		Women		Men		Women		Men	
	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>
Partner (native=ref)												
Minority, exogam	-0.02***	0.00	-0.03**	0.00	-0.03***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01	-0.13***	0.00	-0.08***	0.00
Minority, endogam	-0.02***	0.00	-0.01†	0.00	-0.06***	0.01	-0.02**	0.01	-0.15***	0.00	-0.10***	0.00
Union duration												
2 years	0.02***	0.00	0.01***	0.00	0.05***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.08***	0.00	0.07***	0.01
3 years	0.03***	0.00	0.01***	0.00	0.09***	0.01	0.08***	0.01	0.14***	0.01	0.12***	0.01
4 years	0.04***	0.00	0.01**	0.00	0.13***	0.01	0.10***	0.01	0.18***	0.01	0.15***	0.01
5 years	0.04***	0.00	0.01**	0.00	0.15***	0.01	0.13***	0.01	0.21***	0.01	0.18***	0.01
6 years	0.04***	0.01	0.01*	0.00	0.19***	0.01	0.17***	0.01	0.24***	0.01	0.22***	0.01
7 years	0.04***	0.01	0.01*	0.00	0.22***	0.01	0.18***	0.01	0.26***	0.01	0.24***	0.01
8 years	0.04***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.23***	0.01	0.19***	0.01	0.27***	0.01	0.26***	0.01
9 years	0.04***	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.23***	0.02	0.19***	0.01	0.29***	0.01	0.27***	0.01
10 years	0.04***	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.28***	0.02	0.22***	0.02	0.31***	0.02	0.30***	0.01
Married (1=yes)	0.02***	0.00	0.04***	0.00	0.01†	0.01	0.08***	0.01	-0.01†	0.00	-0.05***	0.00
Region of origin												
Nordic, W. Eur. ^a (=ref.)												
Eastern Europe	0.03***	0.00	-0.02***	0.00	0.07***	0.01	-0.06***	0.01	0.04***	0.01	-0.01*	0.01
Asia ^b	-0.01*	0.00	-0.03***	0.00	0.02†	0.01	-0.07***	0.01	0.03***	0.01	-0.02**	0.01
MENA	-0.04***	0.00	-0.08***	0.00	-0.04***	0.01	-0.13***	0.01	-0.02***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.04***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.19***	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.05***	0.01
South America	0.01†	0.01	-0.02***	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.15***	0.01	-0.02*	0.01	-0.07***	0.01
Age	0.05***	0.00	0.02***	0.00	0.12***	0.01	0.07***	0.00	0.07***	0.00	0.08***	0.00
Age squared	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00
Partners' age difference												
Partner > 2 years younger (=ref.)												
+/- 2 years	0.03***	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.04***	0.01	0.02***	0.01	0.11***	0.01	0.06***	0.00

Partner > 2 years older	0.01**	0.00	-0.05***	0.00	0.04**	0.01	-0.06***	0.01	0.15***	0.01	0.08***	0.01
Age at arrival ^c	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00**	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00	-0.00***	0.00
Child(ren) (1=yes)	-0.06***	0.00	0.02***	0.00	-0.18***	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.05***	0.00	0.06***	0.00
Education level												
Primary (=ref.)												
Secondary	0.21***	0.00	0.15***	0.00	0.39***	0.01	0.34***	0.01	0.18***	0.00	0.21***	0.00
Tertiary	0.31***	0.00	0.19***	0.00	0.73***	0.01	0.60***	0.01	0.39***	0.00	0.43***	0.00
Missing	-0.09***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01	-0.05 [†]	0.03	0.06*	0.03	0.04**	0.01	0.13***	0.01
Couple's education												
Homogamous (=ref.)												
Partner lower	-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00	-0.04***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01	-0.08***	0.00	-0.11***	0.00
Partner higher	0.03***	0.00	0.04***	0.00	0.09***	0.01	0.09***	0.01	0.14***	0.00	0.15***	0.00
Missing (one or both)	0.03***	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.07***	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.06***	0.01	-0.13***	0.01
In education (1=yes)	-0.72***	0.00	-0.83***	0.00	-1.66***	0.01	-1.97***	0.02	-0.37***	0.01	-0.64***	0.01
Constant	-0.16***	0.03	0.48***	0.03	3.07***	0.06	4.30***	0.06	4.93***	0.03	4.78***	0.04
<i>R</i> ²	0.30		0.22		0.29		0.23		0.26		0.25	
<i>N</i> observations	122,728		121,428		109,431		112,913		121,631		120,270	

^a Including the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. ^b Including countries in rest of Oceania. ^c Native born = 0 years.

[†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Appendix Table 2. Regression results using interactions between partner type and union duration, with (Model 4) and without (Model 3) couple fixed effects (FE). Second generation or childhood migrant women aged 20 to 55 upon union formation ($N=24,828$).

	Women											
	A. Employment				B. Individual income				C. Household income			
	Model 3		Model 4 (FE)		Model 3		Model 4 (FE)		Model 3		Model 4 (FE)	
	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>
Partner (native=ref)												
Minority, exogam	-0.02**	0.01	Omitted		-0.04*	0.02	Omitted		-0.14***	0.01	Omitted	
Minority, endogam	0.04***	0.01	Omitted		0.03†	0.01	Omitted		-0.14***	0.01	Omitted	
Union duration												
2 years	0.03***	0.01	0.02***	0.00	0.06***	0.01	0.02†	0.01	0.07***	0.01	0.06***	0.01
3 years	0.05***	0.01	0.03***	0.00	0.12***	0.02	0.08***	0.01	0.13***	0.01	0.10***	0.01
4 years	0.07***	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.17***	0.02	0.11***	0.01	0.17***	0.01	0.14***	0.01
5 years	0.08***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.20***	0.02	0.14***	0.02	0.20***	0.01	0.17***	0.01
6 years	0.08***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.24***	0.02	0.17***	0.02	0.24***	0.01	0.20***	0.01
7 years	0.08***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.28***	0.02	0.22***	0.02	0.27***	0.01	0.23***	0.01
8 years	0.07***	0.01	0.04***	0.01	0.28***	0.02	0.22***	0.02	0.29***	0.01	0.25***	0.01
9 years	0.08***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.31***	0.03	0.26***	0.02	0.31***	0.01	0.29***	0.01
10 years	0.09***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.36***	0.03	0.32***	0.02	0.33***	0.02	0.31***	0.01
Partner*Duration												
Exogam, 2 years	-0.00	0.00	-0.02**	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Exogam, 3 years	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
Exogam, 4 years	-0.00	0.00	-0.02†	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01
Exogam, 5 years	-0.01	0.01	-0.03*	0.01	-0.00	0.03	-0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
Exogam, 6 years	-0.00	0.00	-0.02†	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Exogam, 7 years	-0.02	0.02	-0.05**	0.01	-0.06	0.04	-0.06†	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Exogam, 8 years	0.02	0.02	-0.00	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.03†	0.02
Exogam, 9 years	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02
Exogam, 10 years	0.04†	0.02	-0.00	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02
Endogam, 2 years	-0.04***	0.01	-0.03***	0.01	-0.04*	0.02	-0.04*	0.02	0.02*	0.01	0.04***	0.01
Endogam, 3 years	-0.06***	0.01	-0.05***	0.01	-0.09***	0.02	-0.09***	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05***	0.01

Endogam, 4 years	-0.07***	0.01	-0.06***	0.01	-0.09***	0.02	-0.10***	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.05***	0.01
Endogam, 5 years	-0.09***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01	-0.11***	0.02	-0.11***	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.05***	0.01
Endogam, 6 years	-0.09***	0.01	-0.07***	0.01	-0.12***	0.03	-0.12***	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.05***	0.01
Endogam, 7 years	-0.09***	0.01	-0.07***	0.01	-0.12***	0.03	-0.14***	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.04***	0.01
Endogam, 8 years	-0.08***	0.01	-0.07***	0.01	-0.11***	0.03	-0.12***	0.03	-0.04*	0.02	0.03*	0.01
Endogam, 9 years	-0.10***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01	-0.18***	0.03	-0.18***	0.03	-0.05**	0.02	0.01	0.01
Endogam, 10 years	-0.10***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01	-0.19***	0.04	-0.20***	0.03	-0.04*	0.02	0.02	0.01
Married (1=yes)	0.01***	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01*	0.00	0.00	0.01
Region of origin												
Nordic, W. Eur ^a (=ref.)												
Eastern Europe	0.03***	0.00	Omitted		0.07***	0.01	Omitted		0.04***	0.01	Omitted	
Asia ^b	-0.01	0.00	Omitted		0.02*	0.01	Omitted		0.03***	0.01	Omitted	
MENA	-0.04***	0.00	Omitted		-0.04***	0.01	Omitted		-0.02***	0.01	Omitted	
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.03***	0.01	Omitted		-0.01	0.01	Omitted		-0.01	0.01	Omitted	
South America	0.01 [†]	0.01	Omitted		-0.01	0.01	Omitted		-0.02*	0.01	Omitted	
Constant	-0.17***	0.03	0.67***	0.01	3.06***	0.06	5.47***	0.02	4.93***	0.03	6.35***	0.01
<i>R</i> ²	0.30		0.16, 0.36, 0.27		0.29		0.13, 0.28, 0.24		0.26		0.12, 0.22, 0.17	
<i>N</i> observations		122,728				109,431				121,631		

^a Including the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. ^b Including countries in rest of Oceania.

Note: Marital and cohabiting unions formed 2006 through 2018. All models controlled for age at arrival, age (squared), age difference between partners, presence of any children in the household, education level and enrollment, and couple's relative education. For fixed effects models, within, between, and overall R-square values are reported.

[†] $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Appendix Table 3. Regression results using interactions between partner type and union duration, with (Model 4) and without (Model 3) couple fixed effects (FE). Second generation or childhood migrant men aged 20 to 55 upon union formation ($N=24,864$).

	Men											
	A. Employment				B. Individual income				C. Household income			
	Model 3		Model 4 (FE)		Model 3		Model 4 (FE)		Model 3		Model 4 (FE)	
	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>
Partner (native=ref)												
Minority, exogam	-0.02*	0.01	Omitted		-0.03*	0.02	Omitted		-0.09***	0.01	Omitted	
Minority, endogam	0.05***	0.01	Omitted		0.08***	0.01	Omitted		-0.08***	0.01	Omitted	
Union duration												
2 years	0.03***	0.01	0.01*	0.00	0.08***	0.01	0.03*	0.01	0.06***	0.01	0.05***	0.01
3 years	0.04***	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.12***	0.02	0.05***	0.01	0.11***	0.01	0.10***	0.01
4 years	0.05***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.17***	0.02	0.09***	0.01	0.16***	0.01	0.14***	0.01
5 years	0.06***	0.01	0.01*	0.01	0.20***	0.02	0.13***	0.01	0.19***	0.01	0.18***	0.01
6 years	0.05***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.24***	0.02	0.17***	0.02	0.24***	0.01	0.22***	0.01
7 years	0.06***	0.01	0.01†	0.01	0.26***	0.02	0.18***	0.02	0.26***	0.01	0.23***	0.01
8 years	0.05***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.28***	0.02	0.21***	0.02	0.29***	0.01	0.27***	0.01
9 years	0.05***	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.29***	0.03	0.23***	0.02	0.30***	0.02	0.29***	0.01
10 years	0.04***	0.01	-0.00	0.01	0.29***	0.03	0.24***	0.02	0.31***	0.02	0.30***	0.01
Partner*Duration												
Exogam, 2 years	-0.01	0.01	-0.02*	0.01	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.03†	0.01	0.02†	0.01
Exogam, 3 years	-0.00	0.01	-0.01†	0.01	-0.00	0.03	-0.04†	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Exogam, 4 years	-0.01	0.01	-0.02*	0.01	-0.01	0.03	-0.05*	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Exogam, 5 years	-0.02	0.01	-0.03**	0.01	-0.02	0.03	-0.07**	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.00	0.01
Exogam, 6 years	-0.02†	0.01	-0.04**	0.01	-0.03	0.03	-0.09***	0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.01
Exogam, 7 years	-0.03*	0.01	-0.04**	0.01	-0.02	0.04	-0.07*	0.03	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.02
Exogam, 8 years	-0.01	0.01	-0.03*	0.01	-0.02	0.04	-0.07*	0.03	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.02
Exogam, 9 years	-0.04*	0.02	-0.05**	0.02	-0.11*	0.04	-0.17***	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.02
Exogam, 10 years	-0.02	0.02	-0.03†	0.01	0.03	0.05	-0.04	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.01	0.02
Endogam, 2 years	-0.04***	0.01	-0.02***	0.00	-0.08***	0.02	-0.04**	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03***	0.01
Endogam, 3 years	-0.06***	0.01	-0.03***	0.01	-0.10***	0.02	-0.06***	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.04***	0.01

Endogam, 4 years	-0.07***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01	-0.14***	0.02	-0.09***	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.03***	0.01
Endogam, 5 years	-0.08***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01	-0.14***	0.02	-0.11***	0.02	-0.03*	0.01	0.02*	0.01
Endogam, 6 years	-0.08***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01	-0.15***	0.02	-0.12***	0.02	-0.03*	0.01	0.02*	0.01
Endogam, 7 years	-0.09***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01	-0.16***	0.03	-0.12***	0.02	-0.04*	0.02	0.03*	0.01
Endogam, 8 years	-0.08***	0.01	-0.05***	0.01	-0.17***	0.03	-0.14***	0.02	-0.06***	0.02	0.00	0.01
Endogam, 9 years	-0.08***	0.01	-0.04***	0.01	-0.17***	0.03	-0.15***	0.02	-0.05*	0.02	0.00	0.01
Endogam, 10 years	-0.07***	0.01	-0.04**	0.01	-0.14***	0.04	-0.13***	0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Married (1=yes)	0.04***	0.00	0.01*	0.00	0.08***	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.05***	0.00	-0.00	0.01
Region of origin												
Nordic, W. Eur ^a (=ref.)												
Eastern Europe	-0.02***	0.00	Omitted		-0.06***	0.01	Omitted		-0.01*	0.01	Omitted	
Asia ^b	-0.03***	0.00	Omitted		-0.06***	0.01	Omitted		-0.02**	0.01	Omitted	
MENA	-0.07***	0.00	Omitted		-0.13***	0.01	Omitted		-0.04***	0.01	Omitted	
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.08***	0.01	Omitted		-0.19***	0.01	Omitted		-0.05***	0.01	Omitted	
South America	-0.02***	0.01	Omitted		-0.14***	0.01	Omitted		-0.07***	0.01	Omitted	
Constant	0.46***	0.02	0.81***	0.01	4.27***	0.06	5.75***		4.78***	0.04	6.29***	0.01
R^2	0.22		0.13, 0.23, 0.17		0.24		0.11, 0.23, 0.19		0.25		0.11, 0.23, 0.18	
N observations		121,428				112,913				120,270		

^a Including the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. ^b Including countries in rest of Oceania.

Note: Marital and cohabiting unions formed 2006 through 2018. All models controlled for age at arrival, age (squared), age difference between partners, presence of any children in the household, education level and enrollment, and couple's relative education. For fixed effects models, within, between, and overall R-square values are reported.

† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.