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dc.contributor.authorHagem, Cathrine
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-31T22:04:38Z
dc.date.available2011-10-31T22:04:38Z
dc.date.issued2008
dc.identifier.issn1892-753x
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/180385
dc.description.abstractAbstract: A group of small competitive permits traders facing an imperfectly competitive permit market may consider cooperation (merger) to act strategically in the permit market. It is a well-known result in the literature that the horizontal merger of Cournot players may be unprofitable because of the response of nonmerging agents (a negative strategic effect). We show that the strategic effect of a merger among competitive agents substantially differs from the strategic effect of a merger among Cournot players. Furthermore, we show how the profitability of a merger depends on whether the merged agents are on the same side of the market as the preexisting dominant agent(s). These results show how the expected competitive environment in the permit market may determine how potentially large traders such as the US, and group of small, competitive traders, such as the EU countries, organize their permit trade in any follow-up agreement to the Kyoto protocol.no_NO
dc.description.sponsorshipThe financial support of the Norwegian Research Council is gratefully acknowledged.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherStatistics Norwayno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers;No. 568
dc.subjectEmission permitsno_NO
dc.subjectPermit tradingno_NO
dc.subjectClimate agreementsno_NO
dc.subjectMarket powerno_NO
dc.subjectUtslippstilatelserno_NO
dc.subjectKlimaavtalerno_NO
dc.subjectJEL classification: D43no_NO
dc.subjectJEL classification: Q54no_NO
dc.titleIncentives for merger in a noncompetitive permit marketno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212no_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Mathematics and natural science: 400::Geosciences: 450no_NO
dc.source.pagenumber20 s.no_NO


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