dc.contributor.author | Gunnes, Trude | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-03-22T18:49:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-03-22T18:49:19Z | |
dc.date.created | 2021-08-28T10:15:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 2038-1379 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2986904 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper derives the optimal compensation contract when two asymmetrically verifiable tasks are tied together, a cultural norm of behavior coexists with a financial incentive, and public funding is also a concern. To formulate ideas, we restrict the attention to higher education. The model generates at least three results: First, the monetary incentive for research crowds out the social teaching norm, i.e., peer pressure. Second, increased intrinsic motivation in teaching induces a social multiplier effect on the teaching effort. Third, the government underfunds the university if the teaching standard is lower than that of the government to implement its standard. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Universita degli Studi di Perugia | en_US |
dc.rights | Navngivelse-Ikkekommersiell-DelPåSammeVilkår 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | Cultural norms and financial incentives: A model of how to fund universities | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | 2021 University of Perugia Electronic Press. | en_US |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210 | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 12 | en_US |
dc.source.journal | Review of Economics and Institutions | en_US |
dc.source.issue | 1 | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.5281/zenodo.5380761 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1929458 | |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |