• An experimental investigation of social norms 

      Rege, Mari; Telle, Kjetil (Discussion Papers;No. 310, Working paper, 2001)
      Abstract: Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates impacts of social and internalized norms for cooperation ...
    • EPA's new emissions trading mechanism : a laboratory evaluation : a comment 

      Søberg, Morten (Discussion Papers;No. 213, Working paper, 1998)
      In the US tradable SO2 permit scheme 97.2 per cent of the permits are grandfathered annually to electricity utilities. The remaining 2.8 per cent are withheld and offered for sale at the Environmental Protection Agency ...
    • Imperfect competition, sequential auctions, and emissions trading: An experimental evaluation 

      Søberg, Morten (Discussion Papers;No. 280, Working paper, 2000)
      This paper reports an experiment that studies the behavior of a monopolist on sequential auction markets for tradable permits. Using six sessions in a triple ABA crossover design, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of ...
    • Indirect social sanctions from monetarily unaffected strangers in a public good game 

      Rege, Mari; Telle, Kjetil (Discussion Papers;No. 359, Working paper, 2003)
      Abstract: Several economists have maintained that social sanctions can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates whether indirect social sanctions from monetarily unaffected ...