• An experimental investigation of social norms 

      Rege, Mari; Telle, Kjetil (Discussion Papers;No. 310, Working paper, 2001)
      Abstract: Several economists have maintained that social and internalized norms can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates impacts of social and internalized norms for cooperation ...
    • Does public policy crowd out private contributions to public goods? 

      Nyborg, Karine; Rege, Mari (Discussion Papers;No. 300, Working paper, 2001)
      Abstract: It is sometimes claimed that individuals’ contributions to public goods are not motivated by economic costs and benefits alone, but that people also have a moral or norm-based motivation. A number of studies ...
    • Indirect social sanctions from monetarily unaffected strangers in a public good game 

      Rege, Mari; Telle, Kjetil (Discussion Papers;No. 359, Working paper, 2003)
      Abstract: Several economists have maintained that social sanctions can enforce cooperation in public good situations. This experimental study investigates whether indirect social sanctions from monetarily unaffected ...
    • Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway 

      Telle, Kjetil (Discussion Papers;680, Working paper, 2012)
      Relying on a small natural field experiment with random assignment of treatments, I estimate effects of three core elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. ...
    • Prices vs. quantities with endogenous cost structure 

      Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid (Discussion papers;755, Working paper, 2013-10)
      Authorities often lack information for efficient regulation of the commons. This paper derives a criterion comparing prices versus tradable quantities in terms of expected welfare, given uncertainty, optimal policy and ...
    • Social Norms and Private Provision of Public Goods. Endogenous Peer Groups 

      Rege, Mari (Discussion papers;257, Working paper, 1999-07)
      The formation of peer groups with social norms for private contributions to a public good is analyzed in an n-player two stage game. First people choose a peer group, then they choose whether to contribute. The first choice ...
    • Strategic investment in climate friendly technologies: the impact of permit trade 

      Greaker, Mads; Hagem, Cathrine (Discussion Papers;No. 615, Working paper, 2010)
      Abstract: Our point of departure is that a group of developed countries invest in the development of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement technologies both at home and in developing countries. Such investments reduce the cost ...
    • The Assumption of equal marginal utility of income : how much does it matter? 

      Medin, Hege; Nyborg, Karine; Bateman, Ian (Discussion Papers;No. 241, Working paper, 1998)
      In most applied cost-benefit analyses, individual willingness to pay is aggregated without using explicit welfare weights. This can be justified by postulating a utilitarian social welfare function, along with the assumption ...
    • The political man and contingent valuation : motives do count 

      Nyborg, Karine (Discussion Papers;No. 180, Working paper, 1996)
      In addition to his role as a consumer pursuing his own interests, an individual may also regard himself as an ethical observer, judging matters from society's point of view. It is not clear which of these possibly conflicting ...