dc.contributor.author | Søberg, Morten | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-12-13T11:54:00Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-12-13T11:54:00Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2000 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1892-753x | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/180101 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper reports an experiment that studies the behavior of a monopolist on sequential auction markets for tradable permits. Using six sessions in a triple ABA crossover design, we investigate the cost-effectiveness of permit allocations and the division of trade gains on sequential bid, offer, and double auction markets. The main result is that cost-effectiveness and supra-competitive profits accrued by the monopolist are observed on all the three auction markets. | no_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
dc.publisher | Statistics Norway, Research Department | no_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion Papers;No. 280 | |
dc.subject | Market power | no_NO |
dc.subject | Tradable quotas | no_NO |
dc.subject | Experimental economics | no_NO |
dc.subject | Emissions trading | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: L12 | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: Q2 | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: C91 | no_NO |
dc.title | Imperfect competition, sequential auctions, and emissions trading: An experimental evaluation | no_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | no_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 | no_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 24 s. | no_NO |