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dc.contributor.authorSøberg, Morten
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-07T21:38:25Z
dc.date.available2012-02-07T21:38:25Z
dc.date.issued1998
dc.identifier.issn1892-753x
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/180387
dc.description.abstractNegotiating an international tradable quota treaty between industrialised and developing countries is complicated by uncertain marginal abatement costs and non-uniform quota prices. An initial quota allocation that implies zero expected net cost to developing countries will typically be insufficient to attract their participation in the treaty. Two options to compensate for uncertainty are discussed here, extra emissions quotas and financial transfers. The latter is found to be more effective in facilitating treaty-making, but the scope of co-operation is restricted by the developing countries’ risk-aversion.no_NO
dc.language.isoengno_NO
dc.publisherStatistics Norway, Research Departmentno_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers;No. 233
dc.subjectTradable quotasno_NO
dc.subjectJEL classification: D23no_NO
dc.subjectJEL classification: Q25no_NO
dc.subjectClimate agreementsno_NO
dc.subjectCO2 permitsno_NO
dc.subjectCarbon taxesno_NO
dc.subjectKvotehandelno_NO
dc.subjectLuftforurensningno_NO
dc.titleUncertainty and international negotiations on tradable quota treatiesno_NO
dc.typeWorking paperno_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212no_NO
dc.source.pagenumber23 s.no_NO


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