dc.contributor.author | Asheim, Geir B. | |
dc.contributor.author | Holtsmark, Bjart | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-09T22:26:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-09T22:26:39Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2007 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1892-753x | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/180579 | |
dc.description.abstract | Abstract:
Recent contributions show that climate agreements with broad participation can be implemented as weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria in simple models of greenhouse gas abatement where each country has a binary choice between cooperating (i.e., abate emissions) or defecting (no abatement). Here we show that this result carries over to a model where countries have a continuum of emission choices. Indeed, a Pareto-efficient climate agreement can always be implemented as a weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium, for a sufficiently high discount factor. This means that one need not trade-off a “narrow but deep” treaty with a “broad but shallow” treaty | no_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | no_NO |
dc.publisher | Statistics Norway, Research Department | no_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion Papers;No. 505 | |
dc.subject | Climate agreements | no_NO |
dc.subject | Non-cooperative game-theory | no_NO |
dc.subject | Emissions | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: C72 | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: F53 | no_NO |
dc.subject | JEL classification: Q54 | no_NO |
dc.title | Pareto-efficient climate agreements | no_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | no_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Social science: 200::Economics: 210 | no_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 14 s. | no_NO |