International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game

dc.contributor.author	Holtsmark, Bjart
dc.contributor.author	Sommervoll, Dag Einar
dc.coverage.spatial	Norway	nb_NO
dc.date.accessioned	2019-11-13T10:57:55Z
dc.date.available	2019-11-13T10:57:55Z
dc.date.issued	2012-06
dc.identifier.issn	0809-733X
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2628170
dc.description.abstract	Using a non cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.	nb_NO
dc.language.iso	eng	nb_NO
dc.publisher	Statistisk sentralbyrå	nb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion papers;693
dc.subject	JEL classification: C7	nb_NO
dc.subject	JEL classification: Q2	nb_NO
dc.subject	JEL classification: Q4	nb_NO
dc.title	International emissions trading in a noncooperative climate policy game	nb_NO
dc.type	Working paper	nb_NO
dc.description.version	publishedVersion	nb_NO
dc.subject.nsi	VDP::Matematikk og Naturvitenskap: 400::Matematikk: 410::Statistikk: 412	nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber	13	nb_NO