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dc.contributor.authorBöhringer, Christoph
dc.contributor.authorStorrøsten, Halvor Briseid
dc.contributor.authorRosendahl, Knut Einar
dc.coverage.spatialNorwaynb_NO
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-23T14:10:14Z
dc.date.available2020-01-23T14:10:14Z
dc.date.issued2019-11
dc.identifier.issn1892-753X
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11250/2637700
dc.description.abstractPolicy makers in the EU and elsewhere are concerned that unilateral carbon pricing induces carbon leakage through relocation of emission-intensive and trade-exposed industries to other regions. A common measure to mitigate such leakage is to combine an emission trading system (ETS) with output-based allocation (OBA) of allowances to exposed industries. We first show analytically that in a situation with an ETS combined with OBA, it is optimal to impose a consumption tax on the goods that are entitled to OBA, where the tax is equivalent in value to the OBA-rate. Then, using a multiregion, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to empirical data, we quantify the welfare gains for the EU to impose such a consumption tax on top of its existing ETS with OBA. We run Monte Carlo simulations to account for uncertain leakage exposure of goods entitled to OBA. The consumption tax increases welfare whether the goods are highly exposed to leakage or not, and can hence be regarded as smart hedging against carbon leakage.nb_NO
dc.description.sponsorshipOslo Centre for Research on Environmentally friendly Energy (CREE) Research Council of Norway through CREE.nb_NO
dc.language.isoengnb_NO
dc.publisherStatistisk sentralbyrånb_NO
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion papers;920
dc.subjectJEL classification: D61nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL classification: F18nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL classification: H23nb_NO
dc.subjectJEL classification: Q54nb_NO
dc.titleSmart hedging against carbon leakagenb_NO
dc.typeWorking papernb_NO
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionnb_NO
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Matematikk og Naturvitenskap: 400::Matematikk: 410::Statistikk: 412nb_NO
dc.source.pagenumber46nb_NO


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