The Oil market as an oligopoly

dc.contributor.author	Berger, Kjell
dc.contributor.author	Hoel, Michael
dc.contributor.author	Holden, Steinar
dc.contributor.author	Olsen, Øystein
dc.date.accessioned	2020-04-28T13:23:04Z
dc.date.available	2020-04-28T13:23:04Z
dc.date.issued	1988-03
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2652793
dc.description.abstract	This paper treats the oil market as an oligopoly with a competitive fringe. The oligopoly is assumed to consist of Egypt, Oman, Mexico, Malaysia and Norway plus all OPEC members. The remaining oil producing countries are included in a fringe which by assumption takes the oil price development as exogenously given. Outcomes with varying degrees of collusion within the oligopoly are specified. Intermediate cases are also studied, such as complete or partial cooperation within OPEC, but no cooperation between OPEC and any other countries in the oligopoly. The model is implemented in the PCbased MODLER software, and empirical results from the simulations on the different model versions are presented.	en_US
dc.language.iso	eng	en_US
dc.publisher	Statistisk sentralbyrå	en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Discussion Paper;No. 32
dc.rights	Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no	*
dc.title	The Oil market as an oligopoly	en_US
dc.type	Working paper	en_US
dc.source.pagenumber	18	en_US

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