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dc.contributor.authorStorrøsten, Halvor Briseid
dc.date.accessioned2021-10-05T09:10:12Z
dc.date.available2021-10-05T09:10:12Z
dc.date.issued2021-10
dc.identifier.issn1892-753X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2787652
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates environmental policy in the presence of endogenous preferences. The optimal time trajectory is achieved if and only if the consumer is perfectly time-consistent. The suboptimal trajectories do not only differ from the optimal path during the transition between two equilibria, but also the new stationary states differ. A key difference is more pollution in the suboptimal equilibrium. If the consumer is less than perfectly time-consistent, the standard Pigou tax can be complimented with taxes and subsidies to implement the optimal time trajectory. If this option is unavailable to the regulator, a second-best option is a single tax that is above the Pigouvian level. The results in this paper indicate that the integrated assessment models used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to derive optimal emission paths may recommend too high carbon emissions.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipThe author appreciates financial support from the Research Council of Norway.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherStatistisk sentralbyråen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Paper;No. 964
dc.rightsAn error occurred on the license name.*
dc.rights.uriAn error occurred getting the license - uri.*
dc.subjectRegulationen_US
dc.subjectEndogenous preferencesen_US
dc.subjectHabitsen_US
dc.titleEndogenous preferences and environmental policyen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
dc.source.pagenumber25en_US


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