dc.contributor.author | Bjertnæs, Geir H. M. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-06-04T08:26:06Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-06-04T08:26:06Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-05 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1892-753X | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3132413 | |
dc.description.abstract | This article explores whether altruistic preferences toward households in poor high-temperature
countries stimulate global warming policies within rich low-temperature countries that avoids
damage from global warming. The article analyzes optimal carbon taxes on commodities within
such rich low-temperature countries when damage inflicted upon poor high-temperature countries
are accompanied with foreign aid. The article contributes to the literature by identifying two cases
where the second-best optimal carbon tax for such rich countries exceeds the marginal damage
inflicted on poor countries. First, when rich countries place a higher altruistic welfare weight on
environmental damage than on economic well-being within poor countries. Second, when foreign
aid is hampered by taxes within aid-receiving countries. The article also identifies cases where the
Pigouvian tax implements the social planner solution. Hence, altruistic preferences and foreign aid
contributes to solve the free-rider problem associated with global warming. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Statistisk sentralbyrå | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion Papers;1012 | |
dc.rights | Navngivelse-Ikkekommersiell-DelPåSammeVilkår 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.subject | Optimal taxation | en_US |
dc.subject | Foreign aid | en_US |
dc.subject | Carbon tax | en_US |
dc.subject | Global warming | en_US |
dc.subject | Free-riding | en_US |
dc.title | Optimal Carbon Taxes and Foreign Aid | en_US |
dc.type | Working paper | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | © Statistisk sentralbyrå | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 25 | en_US |