dc.contributor.author | Klette, Tor Jakob | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-02-07T20:12:54Z | |
dc.date.available | 2019-02-07T20:12:54Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1987-10-16 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11250/2584489 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyses whether a welfare maximizing government should tax
or subsidize the home firms in an industry characterized by.
oligopolistic competition and differentiated products. The home firms
are assumed to be pure exporters. It is shown that a symmetric,
perfect Nash-equilibrium in the quantity setting game will involve an
export subsidy if the industry is fairly concentrated, if the relative
number of home firms is not too large and if the products are fairly
homogenous. The paper presents a reduced form 'expression which makes
this proposition precise. In the symmetric price setting game there is
an unambigous case for an export tax. | nb_NO |
dc.language.iso | eng | nb_NO |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Discussion Paper;No. 25 | |
dc.title | Taxing or subsidising an exporting industry? | nb_NO |
dc.type | Working paper | nb_NO |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210 | nb_NO |
dc.source.pagenumber | 14 s. | nb_NO |